We present an optimal experimental scheme for the practical BB84 quantum key distribution protocol. Information that Eve can gain is tightly limited in this scheme. Such scheme can help the receiver-Bob to distinguish how many photons are in the laser pulses, so that it could be implemented in the decoy-state protocols. Using N beam splitters together with N polarization beam spiltters and 2N single photon detectors, Alice and Bob, can detect Eve's various multiphoton attacks, especially the photon number splitting (PNS) attack and coherent multiphoton pulses (CMP) attack. The photon number resolving power in our scheme is approximate to 1/N . Quantum bit error rates (QBERs) of multiphoton pulses can also be achieved in this experimental scheme. Novelly, we find that the rate of secure final key will increase if Alice and Bob discard some bits of their raw key.
(|0 − |1 ), to Bob, who performs measurement in these bases. After classical communication via a reliable public channel, a secret key can be established. Current standard QKD processes (one-way communication) can be described as follow: a) distribution of raw key, b) error correction, c) privacy amplification and d) obtaining secret final key. A general idea is that at some point Alice, Bob and Eve perform measurement on their quantum systems. The outcomes provide them with classical random variables α, β and ǫ, respectively, with P (α, β, ǫ) the joint probability distribution. For a given P (α, β, ǫ), Alice and Bob can establish a secret key if and only if I(α, β) ≥ min α,β {I(α, ǫ), I(β, ǫ)}, where I(α, β) = H(α) − H(α|β) denotes the mutual information and H is the Shannon entropy. Using only error correction and classical privacy amplification, Bob can gain full information on the final key, while Eve gain none. This requires that Bob must have more information about Alice's bits of raw key than does Eve.
An optical QKD system includes the photon sources, quantum channels, singe-photon detectors, and quantum random-number generators. In principle, optical quantum cryptography is based on the use of single-photon Fock states. However, perfect single-photon sources are difficult to realize experimentally. Practical implementations rely on faint laser pulses in which photon number distribution obeys Possionian statistics. Most often, Alice sends to Bob a weak laser pulse in which she has encoded her bit. Each pulse is a priori in a coherent state | √ µe iθ of weak intensity. Since Eve and Bob have no information on θ, the state reduces to a mixed state ρ = dθ 2π | √ µe iθ √ µe iθ | outside Alice's laboratory. This state is equivalent to the mixture of Fock state n p n |n n|, with the number n of photons distributed as Possionian statistics p n = p n (µ) = µ n e −µ /n!. The source that emits pulses in coherent states | √ µe iθ is equivalent to the representation as below: with probability p 0 , Alice does nothing; with probability p n (n > 0), Alice encodes her bit in n photons. Thus, Eve can use two different eavesdropping strategies to gain information about Alice's qubit. Eve first performs a nondemolition measurement to gain the photon number of the laser pulses. When she finds there is only one photon in the pulses, she implements symmetric individual (SI) attacks to gain Alice's information. Otherwise, if there are two or more than two photons in the pulses, she will perform various multiphoton attacks on Alice's qubit [3] . The probability of that a nonempty pulse contains more than one photon is that p(n > 1|n > 0, µ) =
It is a fact that the probability of p(n > 1|n > 0, µ) can be made arbitrary small so that weak pulses are practical and have indeed been used in the vast majority of experiments [1] . A typical multiphoton attack scheme is coherent multiphoton pulse (CMP) attack, i.e., Eve attacks all photons in the pulse coherently [3] . Another important multiphoton attack scheme is photon number splitting (PNS) attack [4, 5] . In long distance QKD, the channel transmittance η can be rather small. If η < (1 − e −µ − µe −µ ), Eve can have the full information of Bob's final key by using the PNS attack. Recently, some decoy-state protocol have been presented to beat Eve's PNS attack [6, 7, 8] . However, such protocols require that Bob must has the ability to perfectly obtain the number of photon in every laser pulse. Thus, security of long distance QKD requires us to beat Eve's various multiphoton pulses attacks, especially the PNS attack and CMP attack.
The purpose of this Letter is to present a practical experimental scheme to beat some of Eve's eavesdropping strategies. We present an experimental detecting apparatus to obtain the photon number of the multiphoton pulses. Such apparatus can also be used to achieve different quantum bit error rates (QBERs) of different multiphoton pulses. In the following text, we first present an experimental scheme to obtain the photon number of multiphoton pulses and QBERs of different photon pulses. Then we analyze Eve's CMP attack hidden in the noises and security of the final key. After that, we present a quasi-single-photon QKD protocol to improve the rate of the final key. Last, we discuss and conclude.
P hoton − number measurement and decoy − state ptotocol. -In the PNS attack scheme, Eve first performs a nondemolition photon-number measurement. She selectively intercepts one photon in the multiphoton pulses and draws information after Alice and Bob reveal the basis. Recently, several decoy-state protocols have been presented to beat Eve's PNS attack [6] [7] [8] . In the decoy-state protocol, Alice intentionally and randomly replaces photon pulses from signal sources by multiphoton pulses (the decoy pulses). Suppose Eve can not distinguish pulses of signal source from those of decoy source. The yield [6, 9] of two pulses should be similar. Thus, Alice and Bob can detect the PNS attack by checking the yield of decoy source. However, such decoy-state protocol requires Bob must have the ability to achieve the photon number of the multiphoton pulses. Furthermore, Eve may use photon number splitting and resending (PNSR) attack to demolish Alice's decoy-state detection. After intercepting one photon in the multiphoton pulses, she adds a false photon to the pulse and forwards it to Bob. The yield of multiphoton is normal and the decoy-state protocol becomes useless on this occasion. Naturally, Eve's PNSR attack would cause some additional QBERs. This requires Alice and Bob both can obtain the photon number and can obtain QBERs of the multiphoton pulses.
In Fig. 1 , we present a method to obtain the photon number of the multiphoton pulses. Furthermore, QBERs of different multiphoton pulses can also be achieved. In Fig. 1(A) , there are N beam splitters (BSs) at the end of the fiber. The probability that two photons were detected in one single-photon detector is approximate to 1/N [10] . Bob can perfectly achieve the photon number of the multiphoton pulses by increasing the number of the BS. Thus, such apparatus can be used in the decoy-state protocols to detect Eve's PNS attack. In Fig. 1(B) , there is a polarization beam splitter (PBS) at each output of each BS. Obviously, such PBSs should be parallel. Using Alice's public announcement, Bob can obtain the QBERs with his statistic data. Moreover, Bob can achieve the different QBERs of different multiphoton pulses, which can help him to find out Eve's PNSR attack. Thus, if either the photon number statistics results or the QBERs are abnormal, Alice and Bob will know that Eve is in line.
In order to evade Bob's various detections, Eve has to hide her attacks in the noises and losses. She may use SI attack on the single photon pulses, which can be hidden in the noise perfectly. Eve also can use a CMP attack to eavesdrop Alice's information. Such attack can be hidden in the noise too. Maybe, Eve can use the PNS attack with a small probability, which could be hidden in the error of Bob's photon number statistics results. If either the photon number statistics results or the QBERs in the communication is abnormal, Alice and Bob will abandon their raw key. Let us assume that both the photon number statistic results and QBERs in the experiment are normal. In this case, the maximal information Eve can gain is bounded by
Let us assume that Alice uses the decoy source with the parameter µ ′ . Information Eve can gain by using PNS attack without being detected should be tightly bounded by p P N S ≤ µe −µ µ ′ e −µ ′ [6, 8] . The probability that all signals are detected is that p D = η(µ + O(µ 2 )). The probability that the sources emits more than one photon is
. So the probability Eve use a CMP attack is that
2 )/p D ≈ µ. The probability that Eve uses a SI attack is that p SI = 1 − p CMP − p P N S [11] .
Coherent multiphoton pulses attack. -Eve may use various attacks including PNS attack on the multiphoton pulses to gain Alice's information. Since Eve's superfluous PNS attack can be detected in a decoy-state protocol, she has to use some other attack scheme. But, the abnormal QBERs could be detected. So, all her attacks should be hidden in the noises. Using the detecting apparatus we have presented above, Alice and Bob can obtain different QBERs of different multiphoton pulses. In the practical quantum channel, all QBERs of different pulses should be identical. So, we consider that the optimal and practical attack scheme Eve may use is CMP attack.
In CMP attack, Eve attaches independent probes to each photon in a multiphoton pulse and measures all probes coherently. In order to simplify the problem, we can reasonably assume that a CMP attack is equal to the sum of all the SI attacks in the multiphoton pulse [3] . The maximal probability that Eve correctly guess Alice's qubit by using optimal SI attack is [1 + sin(x)]/2 with the QBER=[1 − cos(x)]/2 [12] . Thus, the probability that Eve can correctly guesses Alice's qubit by using CMP attack is that 1 − [
] n , where n is the photon number of the pulses. In practice, n is approximate to 2. Consequently, one can obtain
where h(x) = −x log 2 (x) − (1 − x) log 2 (1 − x) and D = QBER. Secure f inal key. -The final key is secure if and only if I AB > I AE max . In fact, I AB is determined by the unique variable QBER since I AB = 1 − h (D). The maximal information Eve can gain by using SI attack is given by
[13]. Consequently, security of the final key is determined by the parameter µ, µ ′ , D. Since µ and µ ′ are invariable in an experiment, security of the final key is uniquely determined by the parameter D. The variable D increases as long as the distance l between Alice and Bob increases. Consequently, security of the final key is actually determined by the variable l in an experiment. A typical QKD experiment is that µ = 0.1, l = 120km, and QBER = 5%. If the decoy-state scheme was used in such experiment with the parameter µ ′ = 1.0, the final key is still secure (See Fig. 2.) .
Quasi-single-photon QKD protocol. -From the discussion above, we know that Eve can get more benefits from a multiphoton pulse than a single-photon pulse. If Alice and Bob can discard some of the multiphoton pulses, security of the communication will be enhanced. It seems impossible that Alice can distinguish the single-photon pulses from the multiphoton pulses today. However, Bob can find out which pulses are multiphoton he received by using the detecting apparatus we have presented. Bob labels such multiphoton pulses and drops them out of their raw key. Since Alice and Bob only use those pulses which are checked by Bob as single-photon pulses to generate their sifted key, we call such protocol quasi-single-photon QKD protocol.
The probability that Bob detects a multiphoton pulse is ǫ ⋍ µ 2 η 2 / p D ≈ η/2. In BB84, one can establish an asymptotically achievable rate of secure final key from sifted key [14] 
That is, in BB84 protocol, a fraction h (t) of the sifted key bits are sacrificed asymptotically to perform error correction by using CSS code [15] . The fraction h (e) of the sifted key bits are sacrificed to perform privacy amplification. The final key rate can be improved with the reduction of h (e). Since Eve can get more benefits from the multiphoton pulses, the final key rate will be improved if some of the multiphoton pulses are discarded. Summary and conclusion. -Today, Eve may use a) SI attacks, b) PNS attacks, and c) CMP attacks to eavesdrop Alice's information. Alice and Bob can use some strategies to detect the presence of Eve. First, they can detect Eve's PNS attack with the abnormal photon number statistics results. Second, Alice and Bob could find out Eve's SI attack with the abnormal QBERs. Moreover, Alice and Bob can detect Eve's presence if QBERs of different multiphoton pulses are different, i.e., no matter how many photons are in the pulses, QBERs of each pulse should be identical. Consequently, Eve's attacks are tightly restricted. The maximal information Eve can gain is tightly bounded by equation (1).
In summary, we have discussed the security of practical BB84 QKD protocol with weak coherent sources, noises and high losses. We present an optimal experimental scheme which can be implemented in the decoy-state protocols. Using our experimental detecting apparatus, Alice and Bob can detect Eve's PNS attacks and CMP attacks. The photon number resolving power in our scheme is approximate to 1/N . QBERs of multiphoton pulses can be achieved in such experimental scheme. And we have presented a quasi-single-photon QKD protocol to improve the rate of secure final key.
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